UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM

3

Protecting tourist sites from terrorist attacks

GOOD PRACTICES GUIDE

Specialized module

Global Programme on Countering Terrorist Threats against Vulnerable Targets

Implemented in partnership with:

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE (CTED)

UNAOC
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Preface

The Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)'s Global Programme on Countering Terrorist Threats against Vulnerable Targets[1] developed this document as a guide on the protection of tourist sites against terrorist acts. This sector-specific module complements *The Protection of Critical Infrastructure against Terrorist Attacks: Compendium of Good Practices*.[2]

Following an overview of key terrorism-related threats and vulnerabilities affecting tourist sites, this module explores the specific role which individual stakeholders can and should play in a complex – and often volatile – security environment by acting within the conceptual framework of a risk and crisis management approach. It contains a selection of case studies illustrating how key security-related principles – including internationally endorsed recommendations – have been operationalized by Governments, private-sector actors, operators of tourist sites and civil society organizations. The module also summarizes the content of several tools (manuals, handbooks, compendiums) which provide guidance on establishing sound policies and operational settings to reduce the vulnerability of tourist sites and increase their resilience.

The analytical framework, case studies, tools and all the resources featured in this module are the result of intensive desk research, a formal request for inputs from all 193 United Nations Member States, discussions with individual experts, international organizations and project partners, as well as input from the Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact.[3] Important insight was also obtained from an online Expert Group Meeting, organized by UNOCT on 14–15 June 2021,

1 The Programme's partners are the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) and United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). The Programme is being implemented in close consultation with other relevant organizations, including INTERPOL. See www.un.org/counterterrorism/vulnerable-targets.

2 The Compendium was developed in 2018 by the Working Group on the Protection of Critical Infrastructure including Vulnerable Targets, Internet and Tourism Security, of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). In 2019, CTITF was folded into the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact. Under this new structure, the above-mentioned Working Group and the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorist Attacks were combined to create the Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection.

3 See www.un.org/counterterrorism/global-ct-compact.

bringing together more than 250 experts from Member States, international and regional organizations, civil society, the private sector and academia. The process also benefited from the input of UNOCT's Gender Advisor and a dedicated human rights consultant in UNOCT's Special Projects and Innovation Branch.[4]

4 This module strives to mainstream gender equality concerns in the various themes addressed. It highlights, in particular, the need to incorporate gender and balance in tourism safety and security strategy plans as well as mainstream gender in training and the practice and conduct of exercises of security and emergency plans. Context-specific considerations regarding gender equality should be incorporated from planning to execution and evaluation of all measures highlighted in this module.

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[1]

The terrorist threat to tourist sites

In its latest review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the General Assembly called upon Member States to "strengthen efforts to improve the security and protection of particularly vulnerable targets, including … tourist sites … as well as to enhance their resilience to terrorist attacks, in particular in the area of civil protection".[5]

Tourist sites are places where specific tourist attractions are located, as well as their immediate surroundings.[6] As such, this module makes a distinction between tourist sites and tourist destinations, the latter encompassing the broader territory (e.g., a city, an island, a country) in which specific sites are located. A single tourist destination may include several tourist sites in addition to infrastructure

5 See General Assembly resolution 75/291), para. 71.

6 Examples of terrorist attacks in the vicinity of a tourist attraction include the detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED) under a bus full of tourists near the pyramids of Giza, Egypt, in 2019, which injured several passengers; and the 2015 attack on the Bardo museum in Tunisia, in which tourists of several nationalities were targeted by militants of Da'esh as they were getting off a bus to enter the museum compound.

that supports one or more tourist venues (e.g., hotels, restaurants, tourist offices, transportation networks).

Tourist sites differ from one another in terms of location, layout, size, management structures as well as the surrounding political, social and economic contexts. Some are places of natural beauty (e.g., beaches, national parks), while others have cultural, historical or religious value[7] (e.g., museums, monuments, houses of worship). Some venues become tourist attractions only in certain periods of the year (e.g., gastronomic fairs). Cruise ships are a special case and may be regarded as fully-fledged "floating" tourist sites as opposed to simply a means of transport.[8] This is evident in the "cruises to nowhere" or "nowhere voyages" concept, where cruise ships make two- to three-night round trips without visiting any ports of call.

Since the early 1980s, globalization has produced dramatic changes in the tourism sector, which is now the single largest business activity worldwide. In just a few years, the number of tourists travelling the globe has grown exponentially. Successive waves of liberalization of trade in services have led to plummeting prices for air transport, directing massive flows of visitors towards traditional destinations as well as supporting the emergence of new tourist spots. Within a few decades, travel for leisure purposes – especially to far-away destinations – has shifted from being a niche activity accessible to only the most affluent sectors of society to a widely popular phenomenon.

In addition to generating significant profits for the tourism industry, the growing mobility of travellers has created unprecedented opportunities for economic growth and development in many countries. However, it has also exposed tourist sites to an increased risk of terrorist activity. Despite their differences, most tourist sites have common features which make them attractive targets for terrorists, particularly when large crowds of people are gathered together inside and around them.

Motivations for attacking tourist sites and their visitors are manifold and may include the following:

- *Expressing hate/disapproval or taking revenge against what tourists represent, or against the tourists' countries of origin:* In the case of crowded and internationally renowned tourist sites, the resonance of a terrorist attack can be greatly amplified by a high number of potential victims and the fact that they may be nationals of several different countries, creating instantaneous and globally impactful media coverage. Additionally, foreign visitors – especially when they engage in expensive travel experiences that locals cannot afford – may be viewed as members of the world's privileged, creating a general feeling of resentment and frustration, which is then exploited by would-be terrorists. Similarly, certain visitors may be targeted because of their specific country of origin. Sometimes terrorists take foreign tourists as hostages and place conditions on their release;[9]

7 Tourist venues that have a religious significance may share – in full or in part – the same threat landscape and vulnerabilities as places of worship. For further discussion, see the module on good practices for protecting religious sites against terrorist acts.

8 Unlike cruise ships, ocean liners are exclusively used for transport purposes.

9 In a recent hostage case involving foreign tourists, two French nationals were kidnapped by local militants during their trip to Benin's Pendjari National Park. Eight days after the event, French special forces, in an overnight operation, managed to rescue them and two other tourists from the United States of America and South Korea. The operation cost the lives of two members of the French commando.

- *Striking a blow at the identity of destination countries:* Tourist sites are, in many cases, powerful symbols of a country's identity and history. As such, attacking them can be a way to strike at the heart of a nation's deep sense of belonging. Such a mindset may prompt terrorists to attack a tourist site that is also a place of worship, signalling their rejection of a specific religious community;
- *Damaging the economy and development prospects of destination countries:* For many countries, the tourism sector is, directly or indirectly, a major source of revenue for a myriad of job-generating businesses. Therefore, attacking tourist venues has potentially catastrophic effects on economies and development prospects if travellers cancel their bookings, interrupt their holidays and plan vacations elsewhere.[10] The negative image associated with a terrorism-stricken country may endure for a long time.[11] Unlike in the past, alternative destinations offering higher security levels can be easily identified. Prospective tourists may take advantage of the virtually endless travel options offered by the transport industry and tourist operators in a global economy and choose to travel to other destinations.

10 According to some estimates, the 2015 terrorist attack in Sousse, Tunisia, produced a loss of US$500 million, or a quarter of annual revenue generated by Tunisia's tourism sector. Also, following the 2005 attack on the sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt suffered an estimated 8-per cent reduction in foreign tourist arrivals the following year (see Brondoni, 2016, p. 9).

11 Although the tourism sector is not normally considered a critical sector, the social and economic impacts of terrorist attacks against tourist venues in places that are largely dependent on tourism may be even greater than those generated by the collapse of critical infrastructure.

[2]

Tourist sites' vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks

- *Vulnerabilities rooted in tourists' own behaviour and perceptions in places and contexts that are often distant from their daily routine and habits:* Unlike other soft targets, tourist sites are often only frequented by one-time visitors with no previous knowledge or training on how to protect themselves in the event of an emergency.[12] Especially during guided tours, tourists often visit several different places on tight schedules. It is often not realistic to expect them to become acquainted with all the security features and protocols in force at the multiple sites that they will visit for very short periods of time. Even when they do not follow strict timetables, tourists may be little inclined to devote any significant part of their leisure time to security matters.

  Tourists may not be familiar with the security culture and framework of destination countries, which may expose them to more heightened risks than locals and foreign residents (from strolling in dangerous neighbourhoods to being dressed and/or addressing the local population in ways that create resentment).

  The growing demand for illegal products or services by tourists (e.g., drugs, alcohol, sex or counterfeit products, depending on the legal framework) inevitably increases the presence of criminal groups operating in tourist areas. When these groups grow in power, and law enforcement agencies lose control over a territory, terrorists may find incentives and opportunities to focus their activities on those "lawless" places.

- *Vulnerabilities created by perceptions and conduct of actors in the travel and tourism industry:* Not all the small businesses that make up the backbone of the tourism industry[13] are necessarily willing or able to develop the same strong security culture promoted by bigger and more structured companies, which can benefit from entire departments devoted to personnel, clients and asset security, and show higher levels of resilience when confronted with a

12 In contrast, members of a religious congregation, or those who regularly attend an educational, social or recreational centre, often have the time and opportunity to familiarize themselves with the features of their surroundings (e.g., location of escape routes, emergency doors, evacuation plans).

13 At the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Counter-Terrorism Working Group held in Bali, Indonesia, on 9-10 May 2017, the proportion of small businesses in the tourism market was estimated at about 78% of the players in the industry (Prof. Brent Ritchie from the Faculty of Business, Economics and Law of the University of Queensland, Australia). In the same meeting, it was highlighted that the tourism industry is in fact rather heterogenous and fragmented, contradicting the view held by some that it is predominantly composed of a few big companies (APEC, 2017, p. 61).

terrorism-related crisis. On the other hand, smaller enterprises may be more effective at implementing security measures on the ground as their whole business is likely to be more directly and radically threatened by a terrorist incident.

Managers of tourist sites affected by security incidents may invest significant amounts of resources in marketing and public relations campaigns aimed at bringing tourists back, thus shrinking the availability of budgets earmarked for security purposes.

The tourism industry may be reluctant to implement robust security briefings and education programmes for tourists out of a concern that these initiatives could give the impression that a certain tourist site is under threat.

Tourist sites dealing with a large influx of visitors may find it challenging to perform proper checks and due diligence on an increasing number of external contractors recruited to perform a range of services such as IT support, cleaning, catering, security guarding and consultancy. In the absence of adequate filters and background checks, insider threats may also come from regular employees, volunteers and seasonal workers.

The significant income gap between tourists and local personnel employed by the travel and tourism sector in many parts of the world may, in the long term, exacerbate feelings of exclusion and resentment in local communities. Such scenarios may provide a strengthened narrative and fertile ground for hostile actors to plan and engage in violent acts against tourists and tourism-related facilities.

- *Vulnerabilities in the sub-optimal institutional and operational response to security issues affecting the tourist sector:* The security needs and requirements of the tourism

industry are often overseen by ministries of tourism and/or finance, while the implementation aspects are left to ministries of the interior and/or defence. Lack of policy and operational coordination across governmental departments may create institutional friction, delays and incoherencies in programmatic approaches.

Terrorist attacks affecting the tourism industry often involve victims of several different nationalities, which may complicate the smooth handling of ensuing criminal proceedings. While some of the countries of which the victims are nationals may provide forensic as well as various types of logistical and operational support to local inquiries, they may, in some cases, bring their own proceedings. The fact that victims and witnesses may be located in different countries may require activating often slow and burdensome channels for international judicial cooperation.

The implementation of fast-track procedures for tourists at border control posts – while justified by the economic need to attract foreign visitors – may reduce the ability of immigration officials to identify the movements of high-risk individuals, thus increasing border porousness.[14] This problem may be exacerbated when the various entities involved in immigration and customs procedures work in a compartmentalized manner, resulting in limited inter-agency information-sharing about high-risk individuals, red-flagged consignments, etc.

When tourist sites are located in remote areas, lack of or poor connectivity may significantly limit the ability of first responders and law enforcement entities to effectively intervene in the event of crises, especially as security-related information is increasingly exchanged via Internet-powered smartphone applications for operational purposes.

Box 1.
Cruise ships' vulnerabilities to terrorist activity

Cruise ships are large passenger vessels used mainly for vacation purposes. As such, it appears more appropriate to regard them as tourist venues rather than simply a means of transport. At the same time, and unlike tourist venues on land, they are exposed to specific and increased vulnerabilities due to, among others, the fact that emergency, rescue or law enforcement services may not be accessible as they may be several hours or even days of navigation away. In addition, cruise ships are a closed environment in which evacuation procedures are subject to severe constraints that onshore sites would not normally experience.

While security risks can be mitigated through measures aimed at deterring potential terrorists from accessing cruise ships and carrying out violent acts on-board (e.g., metal-detector screening of passengers and their luggage), passengers remain vulnerable before and during embarkation procedures, particularly when they form large groups in port terminals and during organized tours.

14 Fast-track procedures are sometimes established by immigration authorities, in coordination with cruise and tour operators, to accelerate the handling of large volumes of passengers scheduled to enter multiple countries on a daily basis.

Moreover, the stringent security-related regulations adopted at the international level do not apply to maritime travel in internal cabotage mode, i.e. the transport of goods or passengers between two places in the same country by a transport operator from another country. In the absence of a strong international regulatory framework covering cruise ships during internal cabotage, it is up to individual countries and cruise operators to design adequate measures for protecting tourists – potentially of several different nationalities – when they travel between islands or ports entirely within the territorial sea of one country.

Cruise ships can also be exploited as vehicles by terrorist actors. In 2018, INTERPOL-led operations “Neptune” in the Mediterranean Sea and “Maharlika” in South-East Asia revealed that foreign terrorist fighters were using maritime channels (including cruise ships) to cover sections of their routes to and from conflict zones in the Middle East.

[3]

Risk mitigation and response: stakeholders' roles and good practices

3.1 Member States

3.1.1 Policymakers

The Global Code of Ethics for Tourism entrusts public authorities with the task to "provide protection for tourists and visitors and their belongings; they must pay particular attention to the safety of foreign tourists owing to the particular vulnerability they may have; they should facilitate the introduction of specific means of information, prevention, security, insurance and assistance consistent with their needs; any attacks, assaults, kidnappings or threats against tourists or workers in the tourism industry, as well as the willful destruction of tourism facilities or of elements of cultural or natural heritage

should be severely condemned and punished in accordance with their respective national laws" (art. 1.4).

Policymaking agencies in tourist destination countries have the overarching duty to frame, direct and supervise the overall risk mitigation and crisis management effort in relation to tourist venues. In their role as initiators and coordinators of a multi-stakeholder approach, they also need to ensure that those with responsibilities in the protection of tourist sites (e.g., attraction managers, tour guides, managers in the hospitality sector) are properly licensed to carry out their functions. Regulatory frameworks for the travel and tourism industry should include clear and stringent security standards against which operators will be evaluated as part of the quality control for licensing purposes.

The following sections provide an overview of the role that policymakers should play in key areas with a view to shaping tourist venues' security and resilience.

Box 2.
High-level Task Force on Tourism and Security – World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)

Established by UNWTO's Executive Council, the Task Force held its first meeting in Madrid on 10 May 2017. It gathered representatives from UNWTO Member States, United Nations agencies and private sector entities such as the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA), the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), the Federal Association of the German Tourism Industry (BTW) and the Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA).

The work of the Task Force focuses on five thematic issues: (1) the integration between tourism and security; (2) support to the sector in setting crisis management plans and protocols; (3) travel advisories; (4) safe, secure and seamless travel including visa facilitation; and (5) crisis communications.

These areas are expected to be addressed by specific working groups tasked with developing recommendations and guidelines to be presented to the UNWTO General Assembly for discussion and approval.

3.1.1.1 Institutional settings and strategies

Several countries are heavily dependent on global tourism for their economic development. This creates strong incentives for public institutions to develop nationwide strategies to promote the growth and sustainability of the tourism sector as a whole. Although these national strategies are often not devoted to security in isolation, it is important that they incorporate a security component. As a minimum, they should identify the broad institutional framework for dealing with the risk and impact of major security-related crises. They should also ensure that whatever

security arrangement or policy they include is compatible with strategies and action plans already in force in the same country on matters of national security, counter-terrorism, critical infrastructure protection, etc. In drafting tourism-related security strategies, a careful mapping of existing policies, protocols and operational guidelines in the broader security environment needs to be carried out to ensure a consistent approach and avoid incoherencies.

The implementation of tourism-related strategies can be given impetus through the establishment of mixed bodies composed of governmental agencies, industry participants and local communities, which act as overarching coordinating entities.

Under the umbrella of such coordinating bodies, a specific working group can then be set up as a specialized entity in charge of developing a safety and security plan based on the national strategy. Ideally, these bodies should be composed of a broad base of stakeholders, such as national tourism administrations/visitor boards, law enforcement and security agencies, immigration departments, attorney general's offices, representatives from customs, transportation, health and foreign affairs, disaster managers, and representatives of the tourism and travel industry.

Box 3.

A prospective tourism safety and security policy and strategy – Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Building on a previous plan, the ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan 2016-2025 recognizes that "safety and security are essential components of sustainable and competitive quality tourist destinations. Safety must be ensured in the use of tourism facilities and services, especially transportation, accommodation and tour operation services, while security against crime, terrorism, and armed conflict must be provided. Although tourism safety and security is undertaken at the national level by the member States, the lack of a consistent policy approach and affirmative strategy towards improving and securing visitor safety and security may affect the ability to position the region as a single global destination. As safety and security are generally not in the purview of national tourist organizations and destination managers, it will be necessary to work with the responsible regional, subregional and national organizations to prepare and implement an ASEAN Tourism Safety and Security Policy and Strategy. The policy and strategy would guide subregional and national programmes to increase and secure tourist safety and security" (ASEAN, 2015, p. 12).

Case study 1.
Guyana's National Tourism Policy

Developed by the Department of Tourism in August 2017, Guyana's National Tourism Policy is the overarching document outlining the path chosen for the development of the national tourism industry. The Policy examines the current state of tourism development, identifies the expected drivers of tourism in the long term and sets out a marketing strategy aimed at increasing visitor numbers.

The Policy acknowledges that the absence of adequate security at tourist destinations can be a major factor in decreasing numbers of foreign visitors due to their reluctance to venture to countries where they perceive a risk to themselves or their personal property. It is in this context that the Policy sets out the following three groups of actions:

- Establish a tourist police unit;
- Develop, in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Security, an action plan for the enhancement of security partnerships between the country's international airport and selected tourist sites across the country; and
- Collaborate with taxi and bus operating services on the creation of tourism awareness training programmes.

Source: Guyana, 2017.

Case study 2.
Applying security by design to tourist venues – Louvre Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

Security-by-design concepts can be useful to include in national strategies for the development of tourist venues. Opened to the public at the end of 2017, the Louvre Museum in Abu Dhabi illustrates how security considerations were incorporated into the construction of a major tourist venue from the early stages of its conceptualization.

The design of the Louvre was based on the *Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning Manual*, which provides planning and design guidance to ensure that counter-terrorism protective security is a structural consideration in the building environment, mitigating vulnerabilities and increasing resilience.

Source: Abu Dhabi, 2015.

Tool 1.
National tourism safety and security plans – World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)
(www.unwto.org/archive/global/publication/tourist-safety-and-security-practical-measures-destinations)

UNWTO recommends that a National Tourism Safety and Security Plan should be established as a result of a multi-stakeholder public-private engagement and address the following areas:

- Identification of potential tourist risks according to types of travel, affected tourism sectors and locations;
- Detection and prevention of offences against tourists;
- Protection of tourist sites and facilities against unlawful interference;
- Establishment of guidelines for operators of tourist facilities in the event of such interference;
- Responsibilities for dealing with the press and other media, at home and abroad;

- Organization of crisis management in the event of a natural disaster or other emergency;
- Development of liability rules in tourist establishments;
- Safety and security aspects of licensing for accommodation establishments, restaurants, taxi companies and tour guides; and
- Provision of appropriate documentation and information on tourist safety to the public, for both outgoing and incoming travellers.

Case study 3.
Costa Rica's strategic security measures for the tourism sector

In 2019, the Ministry of Tourism of Costa Rica announced a series of generally applicable security-related measures, which may also serve a counter-terrorism purpose. Key measures include the following:

- Installation of warning signs on 100 beaches classified as high risk in terms of security;
- Training of 3,500 people employed in tourism services on security measures and attention to tourists;
- Investment of approximately $962,335 for the construction of two police posts;
- Video displaying information about safety measures in the waiting areas of all international airports; and
- Creation of an online chat tool on the website of Costa Rica's Tourism Institute (visitcostarica.com) to answer tourists' inquiries.

Source: A.M. Costa Rica, 2019.

Tool 2.
Tourism Security in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean 2016–2019 – Organization of American States (OAS) and United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)
(www.oas.org/en/sms/cicte/docs/Tourism-Security-in-Mexico-Central-America-and-The-Caribbean-2016-2019-Key-Findings.pdf)

The findings and recommendations featured in this document summarize the outcome of a multi-stakeholder dialogue involving over 800 representatives from the public and the private sectors, and covering 16 tourist destinations in 11 countries in the Caribbean, Central America and Mexico. The three-year project provided two types of training: (1) basic tourism security workshops; and (2) risk management for tourism destinations. It also assisted countries with the development of tourism security plans.

Key recommendations that emerged from research and capacity-building activities conducted during project implementation include the following:

- **Enhance prevention and resilience**

  Tourist destinations may face significant difficulties recovering from acts of terrorism, organized crime, other criminal activities or natural disasters. As a result, if affected by one severe incident, these destinations may have difficulty attracting the same number of tourists they used to receive. Therefore, it is paramount for tourist destinations to invest in resources that can provide rigorous and updated analysis of threats and risks of terrorism, organized crime and/or the potential for natural disasters. This resource allocation may also involve an increase in international and national cooperation, and the development of resilient institutions and societies equipped with emergency response teams (ERTs) ready to respond and recover. A robust planning process that includes a wide variety of public and private sector stakeholders is a critical element in developing a resilient tourism industry.

- **Establish a tourism security coordination mechanism**

  Tourism security can effectively be enhanced through a robust cooperative framework among public stakeholders. It is advisable that law enforcement, civil protection/security, medical services, disaster response and other first responders, including representatives from local and the national governments, assist with the planning and coordination of the safety and security of tourist destinations. Such a mechanism typically involves the establishment of a formal network of stakeholders (public and private) and the adoption of consolidated practices for information sharing. Furthermore, training, practice and conducting exercises of the security and emergency plans with all partners involved in the response is key. It is also advisable that the planning and coordination include gender perspectives and involve representatives from the embassies or consulates of those countries where the majority of tourists originate.

- **Value public-private cooperation**

  Public-private partnerships are key to ensuring the safety and security of tourists. Investment in the tourism industry comes primarily from the private sector. Therefore it is important to develop a formal mechanism of public-private cooperation. This cooperation will ensure improved safety and security polices and standards, and establish the right balance between the public interest and the protection of tourism as business to strengthen security of the tourism industry.

- **Develop a tourism safety and security strategy plan**

  Adopting and providing the necessary training to implement a national tourism safety and security strategy and/or local tourism safety and security plan would provide the necessary framework to clarify and assign the various roles and responsibilities in the protection of tourism destinations, with the aim of leveraging the resources available. Establishing common practices, standards and priorities that are based on current capacity and needs, receiving input and taking into consideration various perspectives from all relevant public and private stakeholders is the first critical step in the development of a comprehensive and integrated safety and security plan. It is important to note that the development of a new safety and security plan may need to accommodate/complement pre-existing plan(s) already in effect, align with the overall tourism strategy, and incorporate gender perspective and balance throughout.

- **Do not plan for everything but be ready for anything**

  Failing to plan is planning to fail. While it is always recommended to develop and adopt safety and security plans, it is also necessary to maintain a certain level of flexibility, to adjust to unforeseen circumstances. Designing safety and security plans by taking into consideration unexpected events allows concerned stakeholders to be prepared by creating the appropriate contingency plan. Effective planning efforts often focus on the process of management and mitigation of contingencies, rather than specific scenarios.

- **Target your audience to improve safety and security standards**

  Tourism destinations are usually more successful when projects and initiatives are developed to attract targeted audiences and customers through dedicated marketing and awareness campaigns (students, business, wedding, nature, culture, beaches, etc.). Therefore, safety and security policies and plans need to take into consideration the targeted audience's needs and particularities and not just copy and paste successful models adopted in other tourist destinations to accommodate their own needs.

(continued)

- **Prevent crime through environmental design**

  Effective safety and security policies typically include an element of environmental design, particularly in the urban context, to support both the implementation of preventive policing (broken windows theory), to enhance the perception of security, as well as the implementation of safety and security operations during a crisis (such as evacuation protocols, emergency routes, etc.). Therefore, it is recommended that safety and security plans are developed in full coordination with the local authorities who are responsible for environmental design, urban maintenance and preservation.

- **Always include the local community**

  The involvement of the local community in the development of a tourism strategy is a key aspect to ensuring increased effectiveness of security planning and operations. When the local community becomes a direct beneficiary of the investment made in tourism, there is a greater likelihood of averting any potential disagreements with the tourist community, as well as being a direct benefit for the receiving communities. Making a concerted effort to avoid the development of gated resorts that do not encourage tourists to engage with the surrounding communities will facilitate socialization between tourists and the locals. This is a key aspect to increasing reciprocal respect and ensuring the establishment of tourism destinations that are more resilient to crime and public disorders. In addition, combining this approach with community policing programmes will likely be very effective within the tourism context.

- **Human rights come first**

  Any security plan should be aligned with national and international legislation and practices. Therefore, adherence to human and civil rights should occur throughout the planning and implementation of any security operation and at every point and level in the process. Furthermore, consideration should be given to the risk of incurring severe reputational damage to the tourism industry, given how fragile the current public perception currently is. Respect for human rights denotes respect for legislation pertaining to the use of firearms and the establishment of a fair and reliable justice system, particularly in relation to vulnerable populations.

- **Promote social corporate responsibility**

  The main component of the tourism industry is business and commerce, which is produced primarily through multinational and private-sector companies. The majority of countries included in this project consider the tourism sector as one of their main sources of income. Therefore, when creating effective safety and security policies, it is critical to carefully consider public interest when developing tourist areas. Creating robust public policies that include social corporate responsibility programmes by actively engaging the concerned private sector and

local communities will likely ensure the sustainability of investments in tourism for the long term, protecting the receiving community and environment at the same time.

- **Optimize your resources, consolidate your practice**

  Tourism safety and security planning is an exercise that may require the adoption of creative solutions, allowing for many collaborative approaches between the private and public sector, especially during peak tourist seasons. Collaboration will help to identify solutions beforehand at national and local levels, foster consolidated policing traditions and practices, and optimize the use of available resources. Such resources can easily be multiplied and shared through partnerships with other public institutions and/or within the private sector. It is worth noting that the adoption of external policing models has not been proven to produce effective results, at least in the short term.

- **Exchange best practices, also with your competitors**

  Any incident or negative occurrence affecting a tourist destination may have long-lasting negative impacts, which may also affect surrounding countries. It is therefore of utmost importance to enhance any form of national and international cooperation, and consider improving safety and security standards on a routine basis to protect people, tourist sites, assets and tourism products.

- **Do not let crime jeopardize your tourism**

  Unfortunately, tourists are sometimes attracted by illicit services or products that may be under the control of some form of organized crime groups, such as prostitution (including child exploitation), drugs, counterfeited products, poaching and money laundering. Tolerating any illegal activities to boost the tourism industry seriously undermines social welfare and development in the local community and therefore damages the tourism industry in the longer term. As previously mentioned, public perception is paramount for tourism security. It can take months and years to establish a reputation that exemplifies a safe and secure tourism industry and take only a single criminal event to damage this reputation.

- **Invest in public transportation and medical emergency**

  The majority of tourists are typically concerned about the standard public services that are frequently used by the general public. For example, specific programmes promoting safe and reliable public transportation, such as secure taxi, buses and safe roads as well as effective medical emergency care, especially in connection with common diseases or accidents, will help increase the confidence of tourists and have a positive impact on the overall safety and security framework.

3.1.1.2 Crisis preparedness, management and recovery

Preparing for, managing, and recovering from crises affecting tourist venues is a tripartite effort involving government (in its various forms depending on each country's institutional framework), the travel and tourism industry in general and local communities. Ideally, public-private partnerships (PPPs) will cover all stages of the mitigation and crisis management process, starting with raising the awareness of the tourism industry as a whole, shaping individual venues' security plans and holding security briefings, exercises and drills with tourist attractions' personnel.

There are no fixed rules for the development of PPPs. Each country needs to follow the models and approaches that best fit its legal framework, cultural settings and capacities as well as the size of its tourism industry. At a basic level, a security planning process can begin in a step-by-step fashion by informally gathering tourist venue managers around a table and engaging them in discussions about how they would respond to different threat scenarios. The discussion may then develop, highlighting vulnerabilities, determining additional stakeholders to be involved and other gaps to be addressed.

Government institutions also need to develop solid mutual understanding and coordinate on operational matters. In particular, "it is advisable that law enforcement, civil protection/security, medical services, disaster response and other first responders, including representatives from local international governments, assist with the planning and coordination of the safety and security of tourist destinations. Such mechanism typically involves the establishment of a formal network of stakeholders (private and public) and the adoption of consolidated practices for information-sharing. Training, practice and conducting exercises of the security/emergency plans with all partners involved in the response is key. It is also advisable that the planning and coordination include gender perspectives and involve representatives from the embassy or consulate of those countries where the majority of tourists originate" (OAS and UNICRI, 2019, p. 11).

Terrorist attacks against tourist venues can be particularly debilitating for national economies, particularly in countries where the tourism sector represents a significant portion of the national GDP. Countries' ability to quickly rebound and re-establish their tourism sector as a magnet for visitors can be critical not only for their development prospects, but also to financing new, and often resource-intensive, security measures necessary to protect vulnerable sites.[15] Ideally, the recovery phase is used as an opportunity for taking stock of security gaps and identifying lessons learned. In some cases, it might be advisable to re-think a country's whole approach to security, which potentially paves the way for larger numbers of tourists than before the crisis. The speed and efficiency with which victims are supported in the post-incident phase is also a critical part of recovery efforts, potentially influencing the outside world's perception of the country as a tourist destination.

15 Depending on the severity of the attack and other local circumstances, the post-incident phase does not necessarily stop all visitors from travelling to terrorism-stricken areas. Sometimes, what changes is the risk-taking profile of visitors to affected destinations. More security-sensitive segments of the tourism market may be replaced by price-sensitive and less risk-averse groups. Those with less spending power, however, often do not bring in sufficient financial resources for local economies to bounce back.

Case study 4.

Initiatives on crisis preparedness and management – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Following the 2015 terrorist attack in Sousse, Tunisia, which cost the lives of 30 United Kingdom nationals, a working group established by the United Kingdom Home Office within the trade association of travel agents and tour operators (ABTA), obtained additional resources. The working group collects and analyses lessons learned, carries out training, coordinates with international efforts and evaluates security measures in place at various tourist sites hit by terrorist attacks (Brussels, Belgium; Orlando, United States; Paris, France; and Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt), in order to brief government ministers and advisors on future policy and long-term capability development.

The United Kingdom has also established the Tourism Industry Emergency Response Group (TIER), which is made up of key tourism industry organizations and governmental agencies and tasked with developing plans for crisis scenarios as well as ensuring the tourism industry's coordination in response to specific crises. TIER's activities are facilitated by VisitBritain, the national tourism agency; its members include the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport; the Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA); the Association of Independent Tour Operators; the Association of Leading Visitor Attractions; the Business Visits and Events Partnership; UKinbound; United Kingdom Hospitality; Britain's national tourist boards; and tourism alliances. Representatives of other industry sectors may be involved depending on the location and nature of the crisis.

Source: WTTC, 2019.

Case study 5.
Mexico's Tourist Assistance and Protection Centres (CAPTA)

Some municipalities in Mexico (e.g., Acapulco, Los Cabos, Queretaro, Mazatlán) have established "Centres for the Assistance and Protection of Tourists" (CAPTA). The initiative consists of a municipal coordination entity composed of bodies belonging to the three levels of government in Mexico, including the Secretariat for Citizens' Security, the Health Secretariat, the Federal Police, the Federal Consumer Protection Agency and the Secretariat of Tourism.

CAPTA centres implement strategies for the care and protection of visitors and are active 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Their mission is to handle all possible scenarios affecting tourists during their stay, including complaints, risks and emergencies. One of the main advantages of CAPTA centres is that they are one-stop shops, bringing together all public and private entities that may be useful to tourists in need of assistance.

The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have declared the establishment of CAPTA centres a good practice and encouraged other regions to consider setting up similar structures. The Organization of American States (OAS), through its Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, and UNICRI, have also played an important role in supporting the launch and implementation of the CAPTA model.

Source: Mexico, 2018.

3.1.1.3 Communication management

Communication issues emerge at all stages of the security cycle and need to be addressed on the basis of predetermined plans and processes. When managing risk, in particular, key items that need to be considered as part of the overall institutional communication effort include the following:

- Developing effective awareness-raising campaigns and programmes (including through the identification of the appropriate channels, means and places) for educating tourists about security risks (and precautions to be taken) at the tourist venues to which they are travelling and which they are visiting;
- Ensuring that tourists know how and to whom to report suspicious or unusual behaviour;
- Opening up and nurturing proper channels of communication with operators of tourist sites to ensure that they are aware of security-related obligations, opportunities for improving security-related standards (including governmental funding options), as well as avenues for liaising with law enforcement and first responders on a preventive basis; and
- Managing official travel advisories in a manner that provides accurate, updated and balanced information to prospective tourists (see box 4).

Crisis communication is also a crucial element of any good crisis management system. It can be defined as "the process, once a crisis has started, of minimizing its negative consequences for the organization and the stakeholder the organization is responsible for. It requires immediate decisions and countermeasures using all the communication tools at its disposal in order to influence and steer its development in as positive a direction as possible" (UNWTO 2011, p. 5). In preparing for and managing security-related crises in the tourism sector, key actions include the following:

- Setting up emergency numbers and contact points that tourists can easily call and rely on to alert authorities about an imminent or ongoing crisis;
- Leveraging social media with a view to mitigating the negative impact of a crisis by influencing the behaviour and actions of tourists and industry stakeholders;[16] and
- Establishing a crisis communication team within a broader crisis management team, with overall responsibility for managing the flow of information from and to all stakeholders.

16 A sound social media strategy involves determining which platforms to use, what to communicate, when and to whom. Coordination across the different social media accounts used by the same organization is also pivotal to ensure that the messages released are coherent and up to date.

Box 4.
Governments' role in issuing travel advisories

Governments in tourist-generating markets, and not only in destination countries, play a pivotal role in communication efforts leading to recovery. Many Governments develop and publish travel advisories to help their citizens assess the risks of travelling to tourist destinations worldwide. One major reason for releasing travel advisories is to reduce the risk of having to take emergency measures for their citizens, including evacuation, in foreign countries.

In this regard, the Global Code of Ethics for Tourism states that "governments have the right – and the duty – especially in a crisis, to inform their nationals of the difficult circumstances, or even the dangers they may encounter during their travels abroad; it is their responsibility however to issue such information without prejudicing in an unjustified or exaggerated manner the tourism industry of the host countries and the interests of their own operators; the contents of travel advisories should therefore be discussed beforehand with the authorities of the host countries and the professionals concerned; recommendations formulated should be strictly proportionate to the gravity of the situations encountered and confined to the geographical areas where the insecurity has arisen; such advisories should be qualified or cancelled as soon as a return to normality permits" (Article 6.5).

In the *Toolbox for Crisis Communications in Tourism*, UNWTO compiled a list of the following core rules that should underpin an effective crisis communication strategy aimed at the tourist sector:

- Do not assume communications responsibility if your organization is not the most appropriate source. Do not automatically assume you need to take a high-profile position. Other entities more directly related to the crisis may be the most appropriate communications lead.
- Establish credibility with audiences by channel in advance. Establish credibility with audiences through regular engagement in specific communications channels. Do not wait until a crisis to enter a new channel. Be a recognized presence and respected source.
- Respond in the same medium. Respond to visuals with visuals, blogs to blogs, tweets to tweets, etc. Meet your audience where they are.
- Stay on message. Once goals and messages have been established, repeat them in all your communications vehicles and at all venues as frequently as possible. Do not deviate from the original message.
- Disclosure. Provide all relevant and verified information.

- Clarity: State your messages clearly and concisely. Fewer words will always be more effective;
- Accuracy: Always be accurate. Make sure you have the correct facts before you communicate. Inaccurate statements will destroy your credibility and make restoring your organization's reputation and image more difficult.
- Transparency: Be open about your sources and who is involved in decision-making. Un-sourced information makes your statements appear unreliable.
- Honesty: Credibility is based on the perception of honesty. Never say "no comment" – it makes you look like you are hiding something that is potentially negative. If you do not know the answer, say so and promise to find out.
- Accessibility: Be accessible to the media on very short notice. They are on a deadline and it is better for you to speak "on message" with facts than for them to create their story without you.
- Know your audience: Different media have different needs and requirements for story angles, deadlines, length of story, interviews. Try to customize your approach to maximize your effectiveness.
- Respond quickly: Issue a standby or holding statement within the shortest time possible. Always respond quickly to questions and requests for information. If you are silent, someone else will most likely say something, perhaps providing erroneous information. Media are on deadline and delays can make you appear to be hiding something. Update frequently. Establish a schedule of frequent updates and do not deviate. The media will pursue other information sources but providing frequent updates gives you a better chance of controlling the story rather than it controlling you.
- Cooperation: Cooperate with all media and do not take favourites. Building relationships based on respect, trust and credibility is an investment in your organization's future.
- Stay Cool: Project an image of professionalism that reflects well on your organization. Never lose your temper or treat a member of the media with disrespect. It can ignite a battle which you may never win.

Communication issues also play a critical role in the days, months and sometimes even years following a terrorist attack that has impacted a country's tourism sector, especially when tourism represents a significant share of the national economy. Tourism is highly sensitive to perceptions of danger and lack of safety and security. For this reason, effective recovery (see section 3.1.1.2) depends to a significant extent on countries' ability to influence the way in which would-be tourists in generating markets perceive the threat in destinations. A good mastery of communication tools is a critical component of any successful recovery effort, even more so since the advent of the Internet. For those planning their holidays, a simple click is all it takes to compare hundreds of possible destinations, travel packages and prices, but also to receive potentially misleading and unverified information about threat levels in destination countries.

Case study 6.
“Wow Philippines”

In reaction to a wave of terrorist attacks in the Philippines that caused the number of visitors to drop sharply at the beginning of 2000, the Department of Tourism launched a marketing campaign called “Wow Philippines” (“Wow” is the acronym for wealth of wonders). The initiative covered three continents including North America, Asia and Europe, and involved local government officials, the travel industry and major partners such as Philippine Airlines. In 2003, “Wow Philippines” was named as the best marketing effort of a national tourism organization at the tourism trade fair Internationale Tourismus Bourse.

The campaign has been credited with helping to make the Philippines an attractive tourist destination again. From 2007 to 2012, foreign visits to the Philippines increased from about 3 million to 4.27 million. The campaign also generated between 2,800 and 4,000 new jobs.

Source: Wikipedia.

Case study 7.
Australia's Charter for Safe Travel

Australia was the first country to establish a collaborative relationship between its Department of Foreign Affairs and the tourism industry aimed at issuing travel advisories of the highest possible quality.

The Charter for Safe Travel, in particular, commits the tourism and travel industry to disseminating government travel advisories to their clients. At the same time, the Government is engaged to maintain a consultative dialogue with travel agents, airlines and tour operators. One year after its launch in 2003, the initiative already had 1,150 partner companies (travel agencies, airlines and tour operators).

The Smartraveller Consultative Group is an additional initiative to enhance cooperation with the tourism industry. The purpose of the Group is to provide a forum for advancing the aims of the Charter for Safe Travel, as well as enable the travel industry to offer suggestions on improving the presentation, format and clarity of travel advice. The Group is not to be regarded as a forum for the business sector to influence the government's perception and treatment of risk in foreign countries, which remains the government's sole responsibility.

Sources: www.apec.org/docs/default-source/Publications/2017/9/Strengthening-Tourism-Business-Resilience-against-the-Impact-of-Terrorist-Attack/217_CTWG_Draft-APEC-Final-Report.pdf; www.apec.org/Publications/2007/04/Tourism-Risk-Management-An-Authoritative-Guide-to-Managing-Crisis-in-Tourism-December-2006.

Tool 3.
***Toolbox for Crisis Communication in Tourism* – UNWTO, 2011**
(https://wearelao.com/sites/default/files/Crisis%20Communications_0.pdf)

The Toolbox is designed to help in the preparation of a Crisis Communications Plan. It includes step-by-step protocols, checklists, sample templates configured by type of crisis and media categories, guidelines for measuring effectiveness, best practices and a special chapter fully dedicated to the use of social media in times of crisis.



Tool 4.
***Tourism Crisis Communications Manual* – Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 2015**
(https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ASEAN-Tourism-Crisis-2015-New-Layout.pdf)

The Manual is the outcome of an extensive consultative process involving national tourism organizations from the ASEAN region acting in the framework of the ASEAN Marketing and Communication Working Group. Its goal is to assist and provide guidelines, case studies and tools to national tourism organizations for the effective use of communication tools for alerts, planning for, responding to and recovering from crisis events and emergency situations. The Manual covers communication with the media and the public, and provides guidance about communication tools to help economic recovery after a crisis. It provides recommendations for types of media training and gives guidance on crisis communications measurements and surveys, media monitoring and analysis, as well as criteria for the selection of spokespersons.



3.1.2 Intelligence agencies

The intelligence community has a pivotal role in identifying the nature and extent of threats to the local tourism sector and feeding this information to policymakers and law enforcement authorities. At the same time, intelligence agencies need to work in close contact with their foreign counterparts to advise about detected threats to the tourism sector in other countries.

Actionable intelligence needs to be collected from a variety of sources, including local stakeholders in the travel and tourism industry. It is often particularly challenging to collect and process "weak signals" that may not necessarily be indicative of any suspicious behaviour, unless and until they are cross-checked with information from other sources that reveals a worrying pattern or even confirms an imminent threat.

3.1.3 Law enforcement

To be effective, law enforcement action to protect tourist venues and their visitors needs to be taken in close partnership with the tourism industry while taking into consideration the specific profile and needs of tourists.

A fundamental task of law enforcement bodies is to reach out to managers of tourist attractions and ensure they are fully aware of security plans in force at the national and local levels, how those plans are triggered if necessary, and of the security roles and responsibilities that arise from them.

As managers of tourist sites seek specialist assistance from law enforcement authorities on the preparation of security plans and measures to close security gaps, law enforcement agencies should be ready to meet these requests, including by identifying a contact point to handle relationships with the private sector. This advisory activity should be followed up by the organization of stress test plans and drill exercises. When local law enforcement agents engage with managers of tourist attractions from the early stages of the risk mitigation effort, familiarizing themselves with the physical features of venues, they may then have a precious advantage during the unfolding of a crisis.

In tourism, perhaps more than in any other sector, it is critical for law enforcement agencies to adapt their approach to people who speak foreign languages and often have different expectations and cultural backgrounds than those of the local population. For this purpose, several countries – particularly those that rely heavily on tourism – have set up "tourist police" corps or branches. Ideally, these units should represent the visible, accessible and friendly face of the local law enforcement community[17] and perform a variety of tasks such as:[18]

- Advising and training tourism industry operators in securing their facilities and conducting background checks on employees;
- Facilitating tourist victims' testimony in criminal cases;
- Developing targeted educational and awareness-raising programmes for tourists;
- Ensuring that sensitive tourist venues benefit from a heightened presence of uniformed officers; and

17 In this regard, the role of the tourist police may be likened to that performed by law enforcement agencies under a community police model.

18 While no studies appear to have been carried out on the specific role of tourist police units in deterring the commission of terrorist acts, such programmes have revealed their usefulness in reducing and/or preventing crime against tourists (Pizam and Mansfeld, 2006, p. 19).

- Ensuring that local tourism-related security needs and concerns are brought to the attention of relevant decision makers.

Law enforcement authorities also have a role to play in post-crisis management, particularly in securing the crime scene in the immediate aftermath of an attack. While this task should be conducted as thoroughly as possible, it can raise specific challenges in relation to tourist venues. When these venues are key sources of revenue for a country's economy, for example, pressure may mount on law enforcement to conduct the evidence-collection process as quickly as possible in order to reopen affected areas for economic activity.

Box 5.
Facial recognition technologies and the tourism industry

The use of facial recognition technologies[19] is quickly expanding in the tourism and hospitality industry. For example, they are being applied in some hotel chains in China, where guests use them to check in without standing in line. They are also used to verify clients' identities and allow quick access to hotel rooms, gyms, etc.

Facial recognition may also have relevant applications in the security field, including for the screening of visitors who seek access to highly frequented sites. Similarly to airports, some tourist venues that receive a massive influx of visitors on a daily basis are considering the possibility of using facial recognition technologies to identify individuals listed in law enforcement databases and manage them before they pose a direct threat to people or property.

19 Facial recognition technologies rely on biometric artificial intelligence to match digital images with those stored in a database on the basis of skin texture and facial features.

In any case, it is critical for such technologies to always be used in compliance with international human rights standards, particularly in relation to their potential for breaching the right to privacy. Another major concern is the fact that facial recognition technologies are still in their infancy. This poses questions about the accuracy of related software, whose margin of error may not necessarily be considered acceptable to protect the public from misidentification, potentially leading to wrongful law enforcement judgment and unwarranted restrictions of peoples' freedom of movement.[20]

Source: Intellectyx, 2019.

Case study 8.
Stepping up law enforcement at Dos Palmas Resort in the Philippines

Following various episodes of kidnapping by the Abu Sayyaf organization in May 2001, the Philippine police bolstered security around popular resorts in the archipelago. As a mass hostage crisis had taken place there, the Dos Palmas Island Resort added security nets to control sea access to the resort. The Philippine Government also increased security in major airports and seaports.

The Dos Palmas Resort hostage crisis began with the kidnapping of twenty hostages and resulted in the death of at least five. At least 22 Filipino soldiers were killed while engaged in operations to free the hostages in the 12 months following the initial attack.

Source: APEC, 2006, p. 84.

20 A 2021 White Paper from the World Economic Forum, in partnership with INTERPOL, UNICRI and the Netherlands police, provides a general framework to ensure the responsible use of facial recognition technology during law enforcement investigations. See www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_A_Policy_Framework_for_Responsible_Limits_on_Facial_Recognition_2021.pdf.

Case study 9.
Sécuri-Site label – France

Since 2016, French "prefects"[21] have been awarding "Sécuri-Site" labels to tourist venues which comply with a series of safety and security standards aimed at protecting the public and site personnel in the event of an attack. The label consists of a logo, which is easily identifiable by tourists. Although it has no legal value, it guarantees the effective commitment of all local stakeholders to the enhanced security of the venue in question. It is awarded following the signing of a site agreement between local public authorities and tourist venue operators and may be withdrawn whenever the prefect considers that the relevant safety and security standards are no longer met. While each site agreement can be tailored to local security needs and circumstances, it has to follow a specific structure and address certain subjects, including the following:

- Identification of contact points responsible for implementing planned actions;
- Cooperation procedures between local public authorities and tourist venue operators in the form of awareness-raising actions and reciprocal security-related information-sharing (maintaining a high degree of confidentiality for the latter);
- Patrols to be set up by the competent law enforcement authority depending on the status of the threat and local circumstances;
- The possibility for the prefect to authorize the transmission and recording of images taken on public soil by the tourist site operator in order to protect the immediate surroundings of site buildings and facilities; and
- The possibility for the prefect to authorize the presence of private security officers on public soil near the site, under the authority of the designated law enforcement authority, in order to carry out surveillance missions.

A site committee is set up to monitor the execution of the site agreements and must meet at least once per year. The site committee prepares an annual report on the implementation of the envisaged actions and takes stock of the security incidents that have affected the site in question. It is also in charge of making recommendations to improve visitors' safety and strengthen site security. The full text of the Standard Agreement between the Prefecture and the Venue Operator is available for download.[22]

Source: Info Protection, 2018.

21 In the French legal system, "préfets" (prefects) are the representatives of the State at the departmental or regional level.

22 See https://data.over-blog-kiwi.com/1/18/83/09/20180713/ob_b334d7_convention-type-label-securi-site.pdf.

Case study 10.
A Tourism Security Training School (CESTUR) in the Dominican Republic

In the Dominican Republic, the Tourism Security Training School is structured as a department of the Armed Forces. Its overall goal is to provide specialized knowledge and equip military and non-military professionals to protect the tourism sector against security threats. The school curriculum aims to promote students' involvement in and contribution to the sustainable development of tourism, in support of governmental actions. Specific objectives include:

- Expanding knowledge on the broad aspects of tourism protection and prevention of related threats;
- Training students in the technical and tactical aspects of military issues relating to tourism security; and
- Providing specialized training on a continuous basis.

Source: Dominican Republic, 2017.

3.2 Non-government actors

3.2.1 Travel and tourism industry

The travel and tourism industry encompasses a variety of businesses that provide services to tourists throughout their travel experience, from booking a holiday in generating markets to their stay in destination countries and return back home. It involves a broad array of entities in their roles as tour operators, travel agencies, guide services, sightseeing organizers, attraction managers, as well as the hospitality and transport sectors.

Each of the businesses in the travel and tourism industry has a specific interest and duty in contributing to the protection of tourist venues in close partnership with public institutions. Failing to do so may expose them not only to significant financial losses in the event of an incident, but also to major lawsuits and criminal and civil liability.

Each tourist site is embedded in unique social, cultural and economic contexts and the applicable regulatory frameworks are different in each country. However, those involved in the tourism and travel industry need to comply with a basic set of common risk and crisis management principles regardless of where they operate. Those principles should become an integral part of the industry's security planning and translate into action aimed at achieving the following broad objectives:

- Ensuring the safety and security of visitors, employees and other people present in tourist venues and their surroundings;
- Protecting related buildings, facilities and equipment from the risk and impact of an attack; and
- In case of an incident, run an in-depth security review leading to a strengthened security environment and quick recovery.

Within this framework, the tourism and travel industry has a key role to play in informing, educating and raising awareness among tourists about a range of security issues. A comprehensive outreach and communication programme must determine the following:

- What information related to tourism safety and security needs to be conveyed to visitors, and at which stage of their tourist experience (before arrival and during their stay in destination countries/tourist venues)?
- What are the most effective tools for reaching out to tourists (e.g., verbally, through leaflets, screens, websites, mobile apps), taking into account the expected type and profile of visitors?
- Where to communicate critical security-related information (e.g., at airports check-in desks, on planes/train/buses and, upon arrival, at terminals or welcome desks, hotel lobbies and rooms).

Some key roles that specific stakeholders in the travel and tourism industry can play and related good practices can be found below.

Box 6.

The Global Code of Ethics for Tourism and the duties of tourism professionals

Adopted by the General Assembly of the World Tourism Organization in 1999,[23] the Global Code of Ethics for Tourism outlines the framework under which its signatories commit to promote responsible, sustainable and universally accessible tourism practices. Addressed to governments, the travel industry, communities and tourists alike, the Code seeks to make the most of the tourism sector's benefits while reducing its potentially negative impact on the environment, cultural heritage and societies worldwide. Although it is a non-legally binding instrument, the Code recognizes the role of the World Committee on Tourism Ethics in managing a voluntary implementation mechanism to which stakeholders may refer matters relating to the Code's application and interpretation.

In relation to tourism professionals, the Code states the following:

- "Tourism professionals have an obligation to provide tourists with objective and honest information on their places of destination and on the conditions of travel, hospitality and stays" (Art. 6.1);
- "Tourism professionals, insofar as it depends on them, should show concern, in cooperation with the public authorities, for the security and safety … of those who seek their services; likewise, they should ensure the existence of suitable systems of insurance and assistance; they should accept the reporting obligations prescribed by national regulations and pay for compensation in the event of failure to observe their contractual obligations" (Art. 6.2).

23 See UNWTO resolution A/RES/406(XIII).

Case study 11.
South Africa's Tourism Safety Initiative (TSI)

TSI is a private-sector initiative launched by the Tourism Business Council of South Africa. Its objective is to create structures and mechanisms through which the sector can effectively manage, coordinate communication, provide support and reduce the level of criminal and other related incidents against business and tourists. The TSI performs the following functions:

- Provides one central platform where crime and other related incidents can be reported and processed into relevant market information;
- Coordinates emergency and other relevant support for businesses and tourists;
- Guides and empowers businesses in the industry to manage criminal incidents and/or other related incidents;
- Raises awareness about safety and security matters among tourists and the tourism trade at large; and
- Lobbies on behalf of the industry and engages with relevant stakeholders involved in crime prevention and the criminal justice system locally and internationally.

Source: Tourism Safety Initiative, 2021.

Case study 12.
Physical protection for tourist sites – Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, and Bali, Indonesia

A 36-km concrete and wire fence built around the beach resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, is one of the measures implemented to protect tourists vacationing at the Red Sea resort. Other measures – whether planned or already implemented – include the following:

- Surveillance procedures with cameras placed at entrance and exits points as well as in streets and gathering places;
- Electronic gates using gamma ray technology[24] to screen larger moving objects;
- Permanent and movable check points established in the wider region with equipment for checking cars for explosive devices and other weapons; and
- Arrangements made with hotels owners to build barricades in front of hotel gates.

In Bali, Indonesia, the security landscape underwent an overhaul in the aftermath of the 2002 bombings in the tourist district of Kuta. This included, notably, tighter security checks on people arriving on the island and at the local airport. "Desa adat" (i.e. traditional villages) applied security controls on activities attracting large crowds, such as wedding ceremonies and art performances. Tourism facilities such as hotels and restaurants have also been secured, including by increasing the number of tourist police officers patrolling tourist resorts.

Sources: Dunn, 2021; and APEC, 2017, p. 48.

Tool 5.
Crisis readiness: Are you prepared and resilient to safeguard your people and destinations? – World Travel and Tourism Council, 2019 (https://wttc.org/Portals/0/Documents/Reports/2019/Crisis%20Preparedness%20Management%20Recovery-Crisis%20Readiness-Nov%202019.pdf?ver=2021-02-25-182725-567)

This private-sector initiative addresses a number of major global risks for the travel and tourism sector today, including the risk of terrorism, as understood by the World Travel and Tourism Council. It aims to advance the discussion on ways to achieve resilience within the industry through qualitative insights as well as the quantification of the economic impact of crises that have affected the travel and tourism sector over the last two decades.

The document contains succinct recommendations on preparedness to mitigate, manage and respond to a crisis in order to achieve a speedy recovery.

24 Gamma ray is a widely used technology for scanning vehicles, ranging from vans and trucks to railcars.

Tool 6.

Don't risk it! A guide to assist tourism businesses to prepare, respond and recover from a crisis –Government of Australia, 2013
(https://icrtourism.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/3_Dont-Risk-It-for-Tourism-Businesses.pdf)

Developed by the Australian Standing Committee on Tourism's Industry Resilience Working Group in its role as an implementing agency for the national long-term tourism strategy ("Tourism 2020"), the Guide is designed for use by any tourism business seeking assistance and concrete tips on how to prepare for, respond to and recover from a crisis. While it does not endeavour to provide advice on every type of crisis event or business, it offers general suggestions that can be tailored to the requirements and sizes of specific businesses in the tourism industry. The Guide includes several templates to help stakeholders in the tourism industry to carry out (SWOT) analyses of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, prepare risk management plans, crisis communication plans, scenario planning, etc.

Tool 7.

Tourism Risk Management: An Authoritative Guide to Managing Crises in Tourism – Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 2006
(www.apec.org/-/media/APEC/Publications/2007/4/Tourism-Risk-Management-An-Authoritative-Guide-to-Managing-Crisis-in-Tourism-December-2006/Guide-English.pdf)

This APEC Guide provides the tourism industry in Asia, the Pacific and beyond with a practical framework to identify, analyse, evaluate, treat, monitor and review risks in the tourism context. It draws on best practice from a range of sources within and outside the APEC region.



Tool 8.
Managing safety and security at cultural events and sites – Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Culture and Communication, France, 2017 (in French)
(www.culture.gouv.fr/content/download/161242/file/Referentiel_Securite_Culture_web.pdf?inLanguage=fre-FR)



Drafted by government entities in consultation with various professional cultural organizations, this Guide applies to tourist sites that host big events or possess a cultural value. It takes into account experiences gained in the broader European context that have addressed terrorist attacks against such venues, including those of law enforcement officials and security professionals.

While providing a reminder that the featured recommendations need to be adapted to the different types of cultural events concerned and the specific layout of the host venues, the Guide draws from an analysis of good practices observed in events that took place indoors (e.g., theatres); outdoors, but in a closed environment (e.g., open-air concerts); on public land; and on heritage sites (e.g., libraries, museums, castles, cathedrals).

The Guide includes detailed technical sheets and self-assessment checklists organized into three work phases: getting ready, prevent and respond. It is complemented by two compendiums providing specific methodological steps to follow for the protection of events taking place in State-owned houses of worship and those taking place in buildings that are protected historical monuments.

3.2.2 Operators of tourist sites

Whether they are monuments, museums, exhibition halls, indoor and outdoor markets or other venues, tourist attractions are the reason for visitors' original travel decisions. Especially when they are world-renowned sites – sometimes even enjoying the status of national emblems – they may represent the most sensitive places where tourists spend time or transit during their vacations. It is thus imperative for the operators of tourist sites[25] to identify potential safety and security risks and develop robust plans for managing areas within and around which very large crowds of visitors may gather.

While the planning and implementation of physical security represent the first lines of

25 The considerations included in this section are also applicable when tourist venues are owned/managed by governmental or government-affiliated bodies, and not only by private entities.

defence, a broader array of measures needs to be considered, such as the following:

- Regular premise inspections to be conducted more frequently and thoroughly as a result of specific threats or heightened national threat levels;
- Evacuation plans, including by installing clear emergency exit signs, creating escape routes and checking that emergency doors are clear of any obstacles. It is also critical to ensure that, during the unfolding of a crisis, tourists are not directed towards areas that may in turn become the target of a secondary terrorist attack; and
- Use of CCTV to monitor large groups of visitors and determine when certain areas are becoming too crowded, or to verify the state of perimeters and barriers. CCTV may also provide critical information during post-incident investigations.

Response and crisis management planning should be designed and tailored to the type and profile of expected tourists. Moreover, the same place may be visited by different types of tourists at different times of the year. For example, while high numbers of families with children may visit beaches during the summer, retired couples or college students may be present at other times of the year.

It is also important for operators of tourist sites to know exactly how the areas under their responsibility are classified under national regulations and policies. For example, a cultural institution may fulfil the conditions as a religious site and thus be eligible to obtain funds earmarked to enhance the security of religious sites.

Tool 9.
Visitor Attraction Security Guidance: 10-Point Review Plan – International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions (IAAPA), 2019

This IAAPA guidance was specifically developed for use by operators of tourist sites. It is premised on the overarching principle that operators need to be proactive in ensuring that their attractions are secure and that all employees remain vigilant. The 10 key focus areas identified in the guidance are:

1. Establish “real-time” communications;
2. Review active shooter response;
3. Re-brief out “run, hide, tell”;
4. Review bomb threat response;
5. Exercise attraction search plan;
6. Apply “hot” search principles;
7. Identify security vulnerabilities;
8. Promote a strong security culture;
9. Prepare emergency “grab bags”;
10. Secure critical infrastructure.

3.2.3 Tour operators

Tour operators are in charge of designing a whole trip by combining its various components (e.g., hotels, airport transfers, activities, restaurants and tours) into a package ready to be sold to consumers.[26] In selecting and putting together these various elements, tour operators are instrumental in the following:

- Checking security levels in destination countries and requiring that the actors involved in their tour packages maintain security standards;
- Including safety and security information in their travel catalogues; and
- Developing, in coordination with public authorities, partners and subcontractors, crisis management plans to be activated if necessary.

Tool 10.
How to manage risks in tourism? – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, 2020
(www.cbi.eu/market-information/tourism/how-manage-risks-tourism)

The Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries, which is part of the Netherlands Enterprise Agency, has developed a step-by-step guidance tool to help tour operators, in particular, understand how to manage risks in tourism, including, albeit not limited to, the risk of terrorism. The document is structured into three sections and is accompanied by practical tips and examples.

1. What is risk management?
The concept of risk management is based on the understanding that the tourism industry operates in a dynamic environment featuring multiple interconnected sectors. This environment is constantly evolving and is especially vulnerable to unexpected crises.

2. Before a crisis: have a risk management process in place
The following basic steps are necessary for the tourism industry to set up an effective risk management process: establish the context, identify the risks, analyse and evaluate risks, treat risks (leading to decisions to avoid, reduce, transfer, or retain the risk), communicate and consult, monitor and review. As part of the "establish the context" step, in particular, tour operators are encouraged to carry out a SWOT analysis with a view to gaining solid knowledge of their businesses from the perspective of economic constraints, organizational strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.

3. During the crisis: Follow these four steps
Practical guidance on the following steps is discussed: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.

26 Travel agents sell the packages created by tour operators.

3.2.4 Tour guides

Tour guides establish direct contact with visitors when they are physically present on vulnerable sites. Key roles of a tour guide include the following:

- Providing the necessary safety and security information at the beginning and, if necessary, throughout guided tours;
- Ensuring that tourists do not wander from the paths assigned, for security reasons;
- Observing and reporting unjustified absences and unusual or suspicious behavior; and
- Evacuating tourists in case of security incidents.

It is essential that tour guides record potential issues affecting visitors' security and promptly report them to site operators and law enforcement authorities, if deemed appropriate. Tour guides' input and perspectives on security matters may also be collected when developing new tour packages or modifying/updating existing ones.

In the post-incident phase, especially when they were present on the crime scene, the tour guide's testimony may be critical in reconstructing crime events in the context of criminal investigations and proceedings.

3.2.5 Stakeholders in the hospitality sector

Broadly speaking, the hospitality sector performs a supporting function for tourists, providing accommodation and other services. The facilities used by the hospitality sector may be located in the immediate surroundings of a tourist site. In this case, security planning for those facilities and for the tourist sites themselves clearly needs to be a closely coordinated process.

Hotel facilities, crucially, have a role not only in protecting their guests while they are present on their premises but should also be part of broader efforts to raise awareness of and educate tourists on the approach that they should take while visiting tourist venues. At a basic level, messages and alerts can be

displayed in hotel lobbies, or communicated verbally at check-in desks. Hotel managers can make their conference rooms available to operators of tourist venues and other stakeholders for the purpose of holding security meetings for travel and tourism industry personnel, or briefings directed at visitors.

Local business federations (e.g., chambers of commerce) as well as associations of representatives from the hotel industry may play a useful facilitating and coordinating role, for example, by ensuring that briefings and training sessions for sector professionals are well advertised, conducted and followed up.

3.2.6 Transport operators

Operators from land, maritime and air transport networks can all contribute to the security of tourist sites in various ways and at different stages of the security management cycle: good practices include the following:

- Transport-related facilities may be used for awareness-raising campaigns and programmes targeting tourists. For example, the arrival halls of an airport may feature announcements, posters and advertisements promoting security and vigilance, in general, or in relation to the most visited sites in the area. Also, the time spent by tourists on buses shuttling from airports or hotels to tourist sites may be usefully employed to draw tourists' attention to security issues and measures.[27] In this regard, local governments, tourist bureaus and business associations could partner with transport networks to maximize the effectiveness of tourist advisory messaging on board means of transport as part of a multi-stakeholder engagement process.
- Drivers of buses, taxis and other means of transport, who often wait outside tourist sites, may be trained to observe and report unusual activity taking place around them.
- During or in the aftermath of a crisis, depending on its magnitude and the host country's ability to manage its consequences, tourists may need to be evacuated from a certain area, either for medical reasons (e.g., victims of a terrorist attack requiring urgent medical care that cannot be provided at local hospitals) or repatriation of foreign tourists/nationals due to an exceptionally high threat level. Transport operators are, by definition, critical to the planning and execution of evacuation procedures. These procedures, in turn, require close coordination with emergency responders, hospital staff, law enforcement, diplomatic personnel, etc.

3.2.7 Cruise line operators

Because of the unique threat to and vulnerability of cruise ships, cruise operators are subject to a specific international regulatory framework. Cruise ships, in particular, fall within the scope of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code[28] of the International Maritime Organization as they are included in the broader category of "passenger ships".[29]

The ISPS Code assigns overall responsibility for security matters to the Ship Security Officer (SSO) on board a cruise ship.

27 Similar initiatives may be run by maritime transporters onboard passenger ships such as ferries. Cruise ship operators, in particular, may need to closely coordinate security messaging and briefings with the managers of tourist venues at ports of call where shore excursions are scheduled.

28 The ISPS Code entered into force in 2004 as an amendment to the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS); it requires contracting Governments and the shipping industry to develop a structured partnership based on the creation of a strong security-based culture and risk-assessment methodology.

29 Passenger ships are defined as ships carrying more than 12 passengers whenever they are engaged in international voyages.

Appointed by the company and the ship's master, the SSO performs a range of duties such as controlling access to the ship, screening goods and people, restricting access to specific areas of the ship, video surveillance and security drills of threat scenarios.

3.2.8 Tourists

The Global Code of Ethics for Tourism assigns tourists the specific responsibility to "acquaint themselves, even before their departure, with the characteristics of the countries they are preparing to visit; they must be aware of the health and security risks inherent in any travel outside their usual environment and behave in such a way as to minimize those risks" (Art. 1.6).

Tourists who have internalized basic security instructions for the country they are visiting may find themselves in an advantageous position during a crisis.

Moreover, even though they may not know their surroundings nor the cultural codes of the places they visit, tourists may be trained to recognize suspicious/unusual behaviour and report it to tour guides, site operators or law enforcement, depending on the circumstances.

Box 7.
The duty of the media and tourists to make informed choices

The Global Code of Ethics for Tourism states that "the press, and particularly the specialized travel press and the other media, including modern means of electronic communication, should issue honest and balanced information on events and situations that could influence the flow of tourists" (Art. 6.6). In practice, this provision is not always followed by media outlets that exaggerate/underrate the real risk involved in travelling to affected areas.

While the media must do its part, it is also the responsibility of individual tourists to plan their travel on the basis of reliable sources of information (see box 4). This is all the more important since, over the past few years, recovery efforts by some terrorism-stricken tourist destinations have been hampered by the proliferation of online platforms that often provide unqualified or unverified advisories, influencing the travel decisions of milions of would-be visitors.

Source: APEC, 2017, p. 23.

3.2.9 Local communities

In most cases, local residents have direct and daily interaction with tourist sites and their visitors (e.g., many are employed in tourist facilities as waiters or janitors). Even when this is not the case, the life of local residents is often impacted by the presence of the tourism industry in their lands and towns.

While local communities can benefit greatly from tourism, they are also at risk of being negatively affected by it. It is thus critical to involve them in early discussions about how security measures specifically planned to protect tourist sites may affect residents' lives socially and in terms of economics. Local communities need to be recognized as fully-fledged stakeholders and an integral part of the security planning process. Depending on the circumstances, they can be involved informally or in more structured and elaborate settings. Fundamentally, channels need to be available where local communities – including transport companies, local businesses, neighbourhood citizen groups and civil society organizations – can bring to the table their grievances and concerns, as well as put forward proposals and solutions.

A positive relationship between the tourism industry and local communities may yield mutual benefits. When the latter perceive tourism as being instrumental to their own economic development and feel that they are part of security-related decision-making processes, local businesses, security wardens, concierges and others who are familiar with the neighbourhood will be more inclined to provide early alerts of impending problems. Local communities can play an important role as supplementary eyes and ears for stretched police forces.[30]

An important objective of the interplay between institutional and industry bodies and local communities is perception management. For example, while tight security measures (e.g., barbed wire fences around beach resorts), may be instrumental in shielding sensitive venues, these very measures may come to be resented as symbols of the economic gap between tourists and local residents. The values and customs that the

30 A study on tourism security found that "destinations that have educated their citizens on the serious impact that crime against tourists can have on their communities and engaged them in a local neighborhood watch, tend to have lower tourism crime rates then do their counterparts" (Pizam and Mansfeld, 2006, p. 20).

tourist population bring may be perceived as posing a threat to local traditions or religious rules. Sensitive assessments may be needed to shape venue security in ways that avoid creating the perception that a tourist site is a "golden fortress", which may in turn be exploited in terrorist narratives and become a target of terrorist activity.[31]

31 For example, to mitigate this risk, efforts could be made to ensure that security perimeters are built in as discreet a manner as possible.

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